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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IRENE PAUL and CHARLES J. 
PAUL, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
WOODRO\V LA WRENGE KIRK-
ENDALL, JOHN DOE, JANE DOE 
AND JOHN DOE COMPANY, 
Defendants, 
and 
MARYLAND CASUALTY COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Garnishee and Appellant. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents (who will be referred to in this brief 
as the plaintiffs) agree with the statement of facts set 
forth in Appellant's brief. 
However, it is necessary to add thereto one addition-
al fact: the chose in action subjected to garnishment 
herein is a liquidated claim. At the pre-trial conference 
held in the garnishment proceeding it was admitted by 
Appellant Garnishee that its liability to the defendant 
judgment debtor herein, if any there is, is the difference 
between the amount of the Plaintiffs' judgment and the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
amount heretofore paid thereon by the Ga1nishee under 
its policy of insurance. The perfonnance of this mathe-
matical subtraction discloses that the claim or credit 
is liquidated in the sum of $10,605.39, with interest at 
So/o from November 20, 1953, for which sum the clerk 
below issued execution at the .smne time the garnishment 
was issued. 
The sole .and narrow issue presented by this inter-
locutory appeal is whether or not the liability of the 
Garnishee alleged in Plaintiffs' reply to the Garnishee's 
answers herein 1nay be reached by garnishment under 
Rule 64D, Utah Rule.s of Civil Procedure. 
Throughout this brief a reference to the "Rules" is 
a reference to the "Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." 
STATE~IEN~' OF POINTS 
POINT I. THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 64D RELAT-
ING TO GARNISHMENT MUST BE LIBERALLY CON-
STRUED. 
POINT 2. GARNISHEE'S LIABILITY TO THE DE-
FENDANT HEREIN IS A DEBT, CREDIT, CHOSE IN 
ACTION, OR OTHER PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE DE-
FEDANT HEREIN WITHIN THE MEANING OF RULE 64D. 
POINT 3. GARNISHEE'S LIABILITY TO DEFENDANT 
HEREIN IS IN GARNISHEE'S POSSESSION OR CONTROL 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF RULE 64D. 
POINT 4. THE AUTHORITIES RELIED ON BY AP-
PELLANT ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE ARIS-
ING UNDER THE PECULIAR UTAH RULES. 
ARGlTl\fENT 
POINT I. THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 64D RELAT-
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ING TO GARNISHMENT MUST BE LIBERALLY CON-
STRUED. 
According to the general rule applicable, to statutes 
jn derogation of the common law, garnishment statutes 
are usually construed strictly against the party resorting 
to the remedy, and, as a corollary to this rule, a liberal 
construction is indulged in favor of the garnishee. 
38 C.J.S. Garnishment, Sec. 3, Page 209. 
The contrary is the rule ·in Utah, and our Rules on 
attachment and garnishment must be liberally construed 
to fully effectuate their purpose and objects, to promote 
justice, and to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of the garnishrnent action or proceeding. 
'rhis Court, in Rule 1(a), has enjoined that all of 
the Rules "shall be liberally construed to secure the just, 
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'' 
The Utah Rules on attachment and garnishment are 
taken from Chapters 18 and 19, respectively, of Title 104, 
U.C.A., 1943, and both the legislature and this court have 
declared that they should receive a liberal construction 
as stated. 
The legislature has specifically provided that, 
"The rule of the common law that Statutes 
in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed 
has no application to the statutes of this state. 
The statutes establish the laws of this state re-
specting the subjects to which they relate, and 
theiT prorvisions and all proceedings under them 
are to be liberally construed with a view to effect 
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the objects of the statutes and to promote justice." 
(Italic_s supplied.) 
Section 88-2-2, U.C.A. 1943; 
Section 68-3-2, U.C.A. 1953. 
And this court has itself declared : 
"The provisions of our statute relating to 
garnishments are very broad and comprehensive. 
This court has held (Cole v. Utah Sugar Co., 35 
Utah 148, 99 Pac. 681) that the statute should be 
liberally construed, and so as to fully effectuate 
the purpose sought to be attained thereby." 
"\Vest Cache Sugar Co. v. Hendrickson, 56 
Utah 327, 190 Pac. 946, 11 ALR 216. 
In that case this court approved a court order re-
quiring a garnishee bank to drill open a safe deposit box 
rented to defendant in order to turn over to the sheriff 
the property of the defendant which might be found 
therein. This is certainly a very liberal interpretation. 
·rhese rules of construction, of course, are deemed 
to have been adopted as a part of the Rules of Procedure 
along with the statutes to which they apply. 
\Vith these liberal rules of construction in mind, let 
us turn then to a consideration of the meaning, purpose 
and intent of the Rules relating to garnislunent as they 
apply to the undisputed facts. 
POINT 2. GARNISHEE'S LIABILITY TO THE DE-
FENDANT HEREIN IS A DEBT, CREDIT, CHOSE IN 
ACTION, OR OTHER PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE DE-
FEDANT HEREIN WITHIN THE MEANING OF RULE 64D. 
This ease, of course. n1ust be decided under the ap-
plicable Utah Hules of ('1i\'il Procedure, which (so far as 
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we have been able to ascertain) are unique, so that deci-
sions from other jurisdictions are of little, if any, help. 
Rule 64D (a) is the b.asic provision as to garnishment, 
although, of course, it must be read and construed in con-
nection with other provisions related to the same subject 
matter. The material part.s are as follows: 
" (a) When Plaintiff entitled to Writ; Affidavit. 
The plaintiff, at any time .after the filing of the 
complaint, may have a writ of garnishment issue, 
and attach the credits, effects, debts, chases in 
atcion, money, and other personal property of the 
defendant in the possession or in the control of 
any third person, as garnishee, whether the same 
are due at the time of the service of the writ or 
are to become due thereafter, under the same cir-
cumstances and by filing with the court in which 
the action is pending an affidavit as required by 
subdivision (a.) of Rule 640, relating to Attach-
ments. ***" (Italics supplied.) 
Where, as here, judgn1ent has been entered on plain-
tiffs' clai1n, Rule 64D(b) (2) dispenses with the affidavit, 
and authorizes garnishn1ent in any action after judgment. 
However, the reference to the Rule on attachments makes 
it clear that the two rules are in pari materia and must 
be construed together, as were the statutes from which 
they were derived under the decision of this court in 
Blue Creek Land & Livestock Co. v. Kehrer, 
60 Utah 62, 206 Pac. 287, 288. 
Rule 640 (a), on attachments, provides that 
"The plaintiff, at any time after the filing 
of the complaint, in an action on a judgment **1!: 
or in an action to recover damages for any tort 
committed *** against the person or property*""* 
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may have the property of the defendant, not ex-
empt from execution, attached as security for any 
judgment that may be recovered*** by filing*** 
an affidavit *** that the defendant is indebted to 
the plaintiff, specifying the amount thereof as 
near as may be. ***" (Italics supplied.) 
Note well the significance of this language: upon 
the basis of a tort claim the plaintiff is directed to make 
affidavit that the defendant is "indebted" to plaintiff. 
}loreover, the "debt" is not necessarily liquidated, for 
its basis can be a tort against the person, and the amount 
thereof need only be specified '"as near as may be." 
Obviously the fra1ners of this rule, in accord with 
their intent that the rules shall be liberally construed, 
are using words, and particularly the words "indebted" 
and "debt" in the broadest possible sense, and intend tort 
claims to be included in that meaning. This is in accord 
with general usage, for Websters Collegiate Dictionary, 
5th Edition, defines "debt" as "That which is due from 
one person to another; thing owed; obligation; liability.'' 
And it is interesting to note, fron1 the discussion of 
"debt" in Bout·ier's Laze Dictionary, Baldu·ins Edition, 
1934, that the word may properly include ''All that is due 
a man under any form of obligation or promise," and 
that the old common law action of debt would lie to re-
cover an~~ sum certain or (in the detinet) specific goods, 
without regard to the manner in which the obligation wa~ 
incurred or is evidenced, as, e.g .. to recover a statutory 
penalty for wilfully cutting tree~. 
Clearly, then, a ''debt" due the defendant, as that 
term is used by the framers of the Rules on attachment 
and garnishment, includes and was intended to include 
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any clain1 for the p.ayment of nwney or the delivery of 
property, whether founded on contract, tort, statute 
or otherwise, and whether liquidated or unliquidated. 
A liberal construction of the broad language so broadly 
used admits no other logical conclusion. 
This conclusion gains added strength frorn a con-
sideration of the provisions of Bule 64D(d), relating to 
the interrogatories which the Rules require the garnishee 
to answer under oath. The garnishee is required to state 
whether he "is indebted to the defendant, either in prop-
erty or money." (Italics supplied.) lie must also answer 
whether he "has in his possession, in his charge, or ~tnder 
his control any property, effects, goods, chattels, rights_, 
credits or chases in action of the defendant *** and if so 
the value of the same." (Italics supplied.) The use of the 
phrase "indebted **""" in property" clearly and unequi-
vocally indicates that the words "debt" and "indebted" 
are not being used in their strict, narrow meaning, but 
are being used in their most liberal, broad meaning, and 
are intended to cover unliquidated tort oblig.ations as 
well as liquidate{l contract obligations. 
Still further strong support for this conclusion is 
found in the provisions of Rule 64D (h), which provides 
that the plaintiff may reply to the Garnishee's answers, 
"and may also allege any matters which would 
charge the garnishee with liability. Such new 
matter in the reply shall be taken as denied or 
avoided, and the matter thus at issue shall be tried 
in the same manner as other issues of like nature.'' 
(Italics supplied.) 
Note well the use of the word "liability," which de-
notes legal obligation in its broadest possible sense. RPP 
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Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Baldwin's Edition, 1934, where 
liability is defined as follows: 
"Responsibility; the state of one who is bound 
in law and justice to do something which may be 
enforced by action; 36 Ia. 226; 57 Cal. 209; 36 N. 
J. L. 145. This liability may arise from contracts 
either express or implied, or in consequence of 
torts cornmitted." (Italics supplied.) 
It is not even necessary to apply a liberal construc-
tion to reach the conclusion that any liability, in tort or 
contract, of the garnishee to the defendant may be reach-
ed by garnishment, as a "debt'•, and if liability be dis-
puted, or the anwunt or extent thereof be unliquidated, 
the "issue shall be tried in the same manner as other 
issues." 
The California Supreme Court in, 
Dunsmoor v. Furstenfeldt, 26 Pac. 518, 520, 
in discussing the word "debt" .as used in a garnishment 
statute declares: 
"Any kind of obligation of one man to pay 
money to another is a debt. ·.l\ .. debt signifies what 
one owes. There is always son1e obligation that 
it shall be paid; but the n1anner in which it is 
to be pairl. or the Jneans coercing payinent do not 
enter into the definition.' •· 
A "credit," as the term is used in Rule 64D(a) sub-
jecting ~redits of the defendant to garnisillnent, is of 
course the opposite or eorrelative eounterpart of a 
"debt." A "debt" or ''debit" on the books of the de-
fendant is a "credit" to the defendant on the books of 
the garnishee. Thus every person "indebted .. to another 
holds in hi~ possession, or under his eontrol a .. rrerlif' 
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-mr•, 
which may be attached by garnishment issued in an 
action against the other, and which can be cancelled by 
paying the ''debt" to the levying officer under the Rules. 
Thu.s the liability of the garnishee here is a "credit" in 
its hands which is subject to garnishment for the bene-
fit of the plaintiffs. 
It must next be noted that by Rule 64D(a) "chases 
·in action··: of the defendant are subject to garnishment 
without limitation or restriction. This is an innovation 
insofar as garnishment before judgement i~ concerned. 
Section 104-19-1, U.C.A., 1943, does not include chases 
in action in the list of things subject to garnishment, 
although Section 104-19-23, U.C.A., 1943, relating to gar-
nishment after judgement specifically authorizes gar-
nishment of a chose in action, and a chose in action has 
always been subject to execution, in which case the sher-
iff is directed to serve the writ by either "collecting or 
selling the choses in action and selling the other prop-
erty." Rule 69(d) and Section 104-37-17, U.C.A., 1943. 
The careful framers of the Rules must have intended 
some positive result fron1 this innovation. 
lS 
Bouvier's Law Dictionary says that a chose in action 
"A right to receive or recover .a debt, or 
money, or damages for a breach of contract or 
for a tort connected with a contract, but which 
cannot be enforced without action." 
And Black's Law Dictionary says also that 
"A chose in action is any right to damages, 
whether arising from the commission of a tort, 
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the omission of a duty, or the breach of a con-
tract." 
It is so generally recognized that the phrase "chose 
in action is substantially all inclusive that we hestitate to 
belabor the point. However, we refer to a few of the 
cases. The phrase includes demands arising out of tort 
as well as contract: 
Sharp v. Cincinnati (etc) Ry. Co. (Tenn.), 
179 s. w. 375, 376; 
Stirling v. Sims, 72 Ga. 51, 52; 
Gillet v. Fairchild (N.Y.), 4 Denio 80, 82; 
City of Cincinnati v. Hafer (Ohio St.), 30 
N.E. 197, 198; 
and includes a cause for personal injury, 
Carver v. Ferguson (Cal. App.), 254 Pac. 
2nd 44, 45; 
and a cause for wrongful death, 
In re Arduino's Est., 20 Ohio Dec. 461, 4 Ohio 
N.P., N.S. 369; 
and a cause of action against a constable for failure to 
deliver replevied property, 
People v. \Veaver (Ill. App.), -:1:0 X.E. :2nd 
83, 8-:l:; 
and a cause of action for fraud, 
Conaway Y. Co-operative Home Builders 
\\\rash.), 117 Pac. 716, 118. 
Whatever may be the rule elsewhere, and whatever 
the rule might have been in rtah prior to the adoption 
of the Rules of Procedure, or (in garnislunent .after 
10 
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judgement) of Section 104-19-23, U.C.A., 1943, a chose 
in action in tort as well as one in contract is now subject 
to garnishment here. Thus, even if we were to concede 
Appellant's premise that the chose garnished in the case 
at bar sounds in tort, its conclusion that the chose is not 
subject to garnishment is nevertheles.s unsound and 
should be rejected by the Court. 
However, the plaintiffs do not concede that premise. 
It is true that it has been said that an action against a 
liability insurer for mishandling the defense and com-
promise negotiations sound.s in tort, but it is submitted 
that such statements are based on an insufficient and 
inaccurate analysis of the facts and the law, and .are 
erroneous. In fact and law the defendant's claim against 
the garnishee, here attached by garnishment, is based, 
and can be based only on a contract-the insurance 
policy. If there were no contract, there could be no 
duty on the insurer garnishee to defend or to, act on 
offers of settlement with any degree of care whatsoever. 
It would be utterly absurd to contend that an insur.anct~ 
company owes any duty to defend or settle a claim 
against a stranger. The insurance contract is and must 
be the source of all the insurer's duties and of all the 
rights of the insured. 
The duty to use "due care" and "good faith" in 
responding to offers of settlement by the holder of a 
claim against an insured arises and is implied from the 
contract provisions requiring the insurer to defend and 
giving it the exclusive right to compromise and settle. 
The situation is analagous to those where a physician 
is required, whenever retained, to use ordinary and 
11 
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reasonable care and diligence, and his best judgement, 
in treating his patient (70 C.J.S. Physicians and Sur-
geons, Sec. 41, p. 947); where an architect is bound to 
bring to the performance of his contract reasonable 
intelligence befitting his profession, and a proper in-
vestigation and knowledge of the business in hand, by his 
contract implying that he has skill and ability in his field 
and that he will exercise them reasonably and without 
neglect ( 6 C.J.S. Architects, sec. 19, pp. 316-317); and 
where a building contractor is impliedly obligated by 
his contract to perform his work in a proper and work-
manlike manner and with ordinary skill and care (9 C.J. 
749-750). All of these duties, as well as the duties in-
volved in the case at bar are implied contract duties, 
not duties imposed by law on all and sundry, and hence 
an action for the breach thereof sounds in contract and 
not in tort. 
Bouvier's Law Dictionary defines tort as "A private 
or civil wrong or injun-. A zrrong independent of con-
tract." (Italics supplied.) The sru.ne work comments: 
"The word tort is used to describe that 
branch of the law which treats of the redress of 
injuries \vhich are neither crinws nor arise from 
the breach of contracts.'' (Italics supplied.) 
An in1plied contract provision of the insurance 
poliry here is that in defending clain1s and acting on 
offers received for the settle1nent thereof the insurance 
cmnpan~· will act with due and ordinary care, and in 
good faith, and (eonversely) will not .act unreasonably, 
m.~g1igent1~·, or in bad faith. \Yhen the courts use the 
t<'rtll "1w.!.digenr.e" in holding- an insurer liable under the 
12 
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circumstances they are not classifying the cause of 
action as one in tort; they are 1nerely using an appro-
priate term to describe a breach of the contract to use 
due care. 
This is made clear by the fact that some courts have 
held that, in the absence of a policy provision authorizing 
such action, the claiinant judgement creditor cannot sue 
the insurer directly on its liability to the insured for an 
excess judgement, because there is no privity of contract 
between the insurer and the claimant. 
Annotation : 40 ALR 2nd 195. 
It may be noted in passing that the policy here in-
volved has a specific provision that a claimant on a 
covered claim may, after judgement is entered (as here) 
sue the insurer directly on the policy. 
The most recent and con1prehensive discussions of 
the duty of the insurer to settle, and its liability for 
failure to act with due care on offers of settlement are 
found in an annotation in 
and in 
40 ALR 2nd 168,170, et seq., 
8 Appleman: Insurance Law and Practice, 
Sections 4712-4713. 
It should also be observed that 
"Where plaintiff in an action for damages 
has recovered judgement, he may garnish the 
defendant's claim under a policy insuring hin1 
against liability for dmnages of the kind re-
covered by plaintiff against him." 
38 C.J.S. Garnishment, Sec. llOd., p. 318. 
13 
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There is no reason why this rule should not be 
equally applicable to the appellant garnishee's liqui-
dated contract liability to the defendant in the case at 
bar. Where the liability is liquidated, as here, and 
arises under contract, as here, it is quite immaterial 
whether the obligation arises under the direct promise 
to pay the liability, or under the promise to defend and 
handle settlement offers with due care. Even under the 
authorities relied on by Appellant the subject claim is 
garnishable. 
Finally, this claim may be garnished under Rule 
64D (a) as "other personal property of the defendant." 
Ag.ain it must be recalled that garnishment Rule is in 
pari materia with the Attachment Rule, and that the 
latter (Rule 64C (a)) provides only for attachment of 
"the property of the defendant, not exempt from exe-
cution." Debts and choses in action are not specifically 
mentioned, but the Rule on the "~fanner of executing 
Writ" (Rule 640 (e) (6)) makes it clear that such claims 
are intended to be included in the term "property," for 
specific provision is made for the manner of attaching 
"debts, credits and other personal property not capable 
of manual delivery," and the Rule on Executions (Rule 
69d) specifically provides for levy of execution on, and 
the "collection or sale" of choses in action. 
The conclusion is irresistable that the garnishee's 
liability to the defendant in this ease is subjeet to gar-
nishment as a "debt, credit, chose in action. or other 
personal propertr of the defendant" within the meaning 
of the Rule and of the statutes from which the Rule was 
14 
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Rule'• 
derived, and there is no error in the order appealed 
from. 
POINT 3. GARNISHEEtS LIABILITY TO DEFENDANT 
HEREIN IS IN GARNISHEE'S POSSESSION OR CONTROL 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF RULE 64D. 
Appellant, in its Point I, argues that defendant's 
claim against the Appellant Garnishee is not subject 
to garnishment because (so it is argued) it is not in 
the "possession or control of a third person." 
Here again we 1nust take issue with appellant both 
on the premise and on the conclusion it advocates. Ap-
pellant assumes that the limiting phrase "in the pos-
session or in the control of any third person" applies to 
credits, debts and cho.ses in action as it does to tangible 
personal property. We submit that this is not so. 
Tangible personal property in defendant's posses-
sion or not in the possession, custody or control of any-
one, is attached or levied upon by taking it physically 
into the custody of the sheriff, as provided in Rule 
64C(e) (3), whereas debts and credits and tangible 
property in the possession or control of a third person 
(as a bailee or pledgee) may be reached by garnish-
ment of the person in control or possession. The two 
procedures are complementary, and together afford a 
remedy by which any kind of property can be reached 
by a judgment creditor. To some extent the two proce-
dures may even overlap, as where tangible property in 
the hands of a third person may be either garnished or 
levied on under attachment or execution, the plaintiff 
being entitled to elect his remedy. 
But under our Rules a debt (which is also a chose 
15 
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in action) can clearly be reached by garnishment, and 
indeed, under the universal practice it is so reached, 
without reference as to who has "the posses.sion or con-
trol." It is abundantly apparent that the framers of the 
Rule intended the limitation as to possession or control 
to be applicable only to tangible personal property, 
and not to debts, credits, or choses in action, i.e., to in-
tangible personal property. 
The conclusion that the subject claim is not in the 
possession or control of the garnishee here is equally 
unsound. For all essential purposes under the garnish-
ment rules a debtor, or the obligor of a chose in action 
is in the control of the subject debt or damage obligation: 
he can pay, or withhold payment to the creditor, or he 
can pay or withhold payment to an assignee, or he can 
pay or withhold pay1nent to the levying officer (at least 
until judgmnent has been entered in the garnishment 
proceeding). And even after assignment of the debt 
or chose, he can, unless notified, discharge the obli-
gation by paying the original creditor instead of his 
successor. 
By specific provision of the Garnislnnent Rule, the 
Garnishee may deli \·er to the lev~i.ng officer the property 
belonging to the defendant, together with the money due 
the defendant and be relieyed frmu further liability in 
tlw proceedings. 
Rule <i4D(g). 
If tlw garnishee answerf' that he has possession or 
control of defendant's property or is indebted (liable) 
to the defendant, the Court n1ust enter judge1nent for 
t lw deliv<'r~· of the property to the f'heriff, to be sold 
16 
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under execution, and, as to 1noney obligations, must 
"enter judgement in favor of the defendant for the use 
of the plaintiff against the garnishee" for the amount 
due. 
Rule 64D(i). 
And if the garnishee denies liability to the defend-
ant, and the denial is traversed, or facts alleged charging 
the garnishee with liability, that "issue shall be tried 
in the san1e manner as other issues of like nature. 
Judgement shall be rendered on the verdict or finding 
the same as if the garnishee had answered according to 
such verdict or finding." (Italics supplied.) 
Rule 64D(h). 
And that judgement "shall acquit him (the gar-
nishee) from all demands by the defendant for all goods, 
effects or credits paid, delivered or accounted for by the 
garnishee by force" thereof, just as under the attachment 
rule "Pa-yment of such debts, or delivery or transfer of 
such property or debts, to the officer shall be a suf-
ficient discharge of the same as to the defendant." 
Rules 64D(k), and 64C(m). 
What more control is necessary than the garnishee's 
authority and power to acquit himself of all obligations 
to the defendant by paying his obligation to the officer 
or into court in obedience to the process and judgements 
of the court? \V e confess we cannot imagine. All parties 
are protected, and justice is done speedily and economic-
ally, and in full accord with established and recognized 
procedures. 
The case of M ortmer vs. Young, L27 Pac. 2nd 950, 
relied on by Appellant is not in point in this issue. It 
17 
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holds n1erely that a chose in action for fraud is suf-
ficiently in the control of the owner thereof that notice 
to him will support an execution sale of the chose upon 
which the purchaser might later bring action against the 
tort feasor. It is not a case such as the one at bar in 
which the judgement creditor seeks to collect the chose 
in action by judicial process. And it held the chose sub-
.iect to levy by execution. 
Neither is A.ppellant's case of Bassett v. McCarty, 
101 P. 2nd 575, where the Washington Court, manifestly 
strongly influenced by what it felt would be unwarranted 
hardship on the garnishee, under the Washington Stat-
ute, held generally that "unliquidated" tort claims are 
not subject to garnishment, and that the rendering of 
a verdict does not change this rule while the action is 
still pending in court before entry of judgement, as the 
claim is not under the control of the garnishee. The 
latter ruling can perhaps be justified on the ground that 
once action is filed on the claim, the matter is in the con-
trol of the court, which, for orderly procedure, must 
control the parties appearing and consent to any sub-
stitution. An action was alre.ady pending on the claim, 
and a second garnishee action manifestly should abate. 
The effective result 1night well have been different if 
the plaintiff had levied on the clailn and then filed a 
petition to intervene or to be substituted as a plaintiff 
in the .action pending. No prior aetion was pending when 
garnishment was served herein. It must be re1nen1bered 
also that the clailn in the case at bar has been liquidated 
from its inception. 
l\ioreover, California ha~ reached the contrary con-
clusion. See 
18 
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See also 
Department of Water and Power of the City 
of Los Angeles v. Inyo Chemical Co., 108 
Pac. 2nd 410. 
Sniderman v. Nerone (Pa.), 9 Atl. 2nd 335, 
and 
Barr v. Warner (Ore.), 62 Pac. 99. 
POINT 4. THE AUTHORITIES RELIED ON BY AP-
PELLANT ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE ARIS-
ING UNDER THE PEoCULIAR UTAH RULES. 
Each case is, of course, limited by the facts involved, 
the statutes controlling and the rule of construction ap-
plicable. 
Few of the cases cited by appellant appear to come 
frorn jurisdictions where, .as here, a liberal rule of con-
struction must be followed. Certainly the decisions cited 
apply a very strict rule of construction to the garnish-
ment statutes considered. 
And, as we have before indicated, none of the juris-
dictions relied on by appellant have statutes which even 
approach our Rules in their broad and comprehensive 
scope and terminology, which conforms so well to the 
basic philosophy behind the Rules that every right shall 
be supported by a direct, speedy, simple and inexpensive 
remedy. Accordingly decisions from other jurisdictions 
restricting and lin1iting garnishrnent therein can have 
little if any application under the Utah Rules. 
Other decisions relied on by Appellant are dis-
tinguishable on their facts. In an effort to assist the 
court we will consider son1e of these very briefly. 
The case of Brenau College v. Mincey, 61 S.E. 2nd 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
301, cited on Page 7 of Appellant's Brief, involved a tort 
claim for loss of the services of claimant's wife-a claim 
which was purely personal to the claimant and which 
he could not assign, even voluntarily. It was unliqui-
dated. The claim here is liquidated and it is assignable, 
as we shall see. The fact that such a claim is not assign-
able is of the utmost significance, as appears from Lewis 
v. Barnett (Kan.), 33 Pac. 2nd 331, 93 A.L.R. 1082, cited 
on page 7 of Appellant's Brief. There .attempt was made 
to garnish an unliquidated chose in action for personal 
injuries, which is universally held to be incapable of 
assignment, as is an injury to reputation. See 
6 C.J .S. Assignments, Sec. 33, p. 1081. 
The Kansas Court declared, "Garnishment is in effect 
a formal judicial assignment of such actual property, 
money and credits that would be capable of being volun-
tarily assigned.'' It held that as the claimant could not 
have transferred it voluntarily, it could not be trans-
ferred involuntarily by garnishment. 
Similarly the cases of Coty v. Cogswell, 50 Pac. 
2nd 249; Pacific Gas and Elect1·ic Co. v. Nakano, 87 Pac. 
2nd 700, 121 A.L.R. 417; and 1Jlcvleilty v. Furman, 95 Atl. 
2nd 267, 35 A.L.R. 2nd 1436, cited on page 7 of Appel-
lant's Brief, all involve unliquidated and 110n-assignnble 
claims based on personal injury. 
The case of Black v. Plumb, 29 Pac. 2nd 708, 91 
A.L.R. 1334, cited on page 5 of Appellant's Brief, also 
involves an unliq'ttidated elaiin. \Vhile it is true that the 
clain1 there was assignable (a claim for conversion of 
property), the Colorado Court there does not consider 
that rnattPr, nor does it ronsider the possible application 
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of the phrase "chose in action" in the Colorado Statute, 
but blindly, and (we believe) erroneously followed Don-
ald Co. v. Dubinsky, 219 Pac. 209, in which it was prop-
erly held that garnishn1ent was not available in aid of 
an action for deceit, a tort clailn, where under the Colo-
rado Code of Civil Procedure, Section 97, garnishment 
is available only in aid of an action on a contract. Cer-
tainly, from the fact that garnishment will not issue 
except in a contract action it does not follow that tort 
claims are not subject to attachment by garnishment 
where the writ has been properly issued. If this were 
true, we would claim this case as authority to support 
the position of plaintiffs herein, for here we have the 
converse: a rule authorizing garnishment in aid of un-
liquidated non-assignable tort claims, so that, by the 
s.ame reasoning, unliquidated, non-assignable, tort claims 
should be garnishable. 
We have already 1nentioned briefly the ca.ses of 
Mortimer vs. Young, 127 Pac. 2d 950, and Bassett v. 
McCarty, 101 Pac. 2d 575 (page 8 of Appellant's Brief). 
The first held that a chose in action for fraud is subject 
to levy and sale under execution, and hence supports 
plaintiffs' position here, and the second involved an un-
assignable tort claim for slander. Interestingly enough 
the same court has held that a cause of action for alien-
ation of affections is a "debt" in .aid of which garnish-
ment may issue under the Washington Statute! 
As we have said, it is admitted that the claim in-
volved in the case at bar is, and since its inception it 
has been liquidated. As it arises either on contract or 
(according to Appellant's view) on tort for injury to the 
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defendant'.s property or estate (as distinguished from 
his person or reputation) it is assignable: 
6 C.J.S. Assignments, sections 31 and 34, pp. 
1080 and 1082. 
Even an unliquidated clailn on an insurance policy 
rnay be subject to garnish1nent. See, 
Brainard vs. Rogers, 239 Pac. 1095, and 
Security Building and Loan Association vs. 
Ward (Okla.), 50 Pac. 2nd, 651. 
It is submitted that the proper rule in Utah is that 
any chose in action, in contract, in tort, or statute, or 
otherwise, and whether liquidated or unliquidated, is 
subject to garnishment if it is assignable. However, 
inasmuch as the clain1 here is liquidated, it is unnec-
essary to decide in this case whether an unliquidated 
claim is within the rule. 
It may well be that the legislature, by the adoption 
of the statute last appearing as section 104-19-23, U.C.A., 
1943, intended to make otherwise non-assignable choses 
in action subject to garnishment under the liberal con-
struction there specifically required. If so, this would 
make a change in the substantive comn1on law on assign-
ability of claims which the Court could not properly 
change by a rule of procedure. But here again it is un-
necessary to decide the point, .as our claim is assignable. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respertfully subrnitted that the elain1 of the 
defendant Kirkendall against the appellant garnishee is 
a liquidatr-d, a~signahle debt, rredit, or ehose in action, 
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or is otherwise property of the defendant in the gar-
nishee's control, and as such it is subject to the garnish-
ment issued on plaintiffs' judgen1ent and served on the 
Garnishee. 
Common justice requires that if the defendant has 
a valid claiin it be made subject to the payment of plain-
tiffs' modest judgement which is one of the factors on 
which the claim is based. Defendant has nothing else 
on which to levy. The liber.al construction for which the 
Rules themselves provide equally requires this result. 
It is respectfully submitted that there is no error 
in the interlocutory order appealed from, and it should 
be affirmed and the garnishment procleeding remanded 
for trial under the provisions of Rule 64D (h). 
Respectfully submitted, 
YOUNG, THATCHER & 
GLAS1'IANN 
1018 First Security Bank 
Building 
Ogden, Utah 
and 
MILO V. OLSON 
518 Pacific Mutual Building 
Los Angeles 14, California 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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